Smell of Marijuana, Traffic-Stop Timing, and Frisks: Fourth Circuit Upholds Gun Seizure
United States v. Carson, No. 25-4200 (4th Cir. July 8, 2026)
TL;DR
Police stopped a vehicle because the driver had a suspended license. Within seconds of arriving, another officer smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and then observed a digital scale with white residue inside. Officers searched the vehicle and ordered the occupants out.
One passenger, Jermaine Carson, was frisked. During the frisk, Carson told the officer he had a gun, and officers recovered a loaded Glock from his pants.
Carson moved to suppress, arguing that officers unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him.
The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments.
Once an officer smelled marijuana, independent reasonable suspicion existed to expand the investigation beyond the original traffic mission. And under existing Fourth Circuit precedent, when officers reasonably suspect illegal drugs are inside a vehicle, they may generally order the occupants out and briefly frisk them for weapons in the absence of circumstances alleviating the safety concern.
But a separate concurrence questioned whether that nearly 30-year-old drugs-equal-guns rule remains constitutionally sound in an era of widespread marijuana legalization.
Facts
In 2023, the property manager of Aston Park Tower and Gardens, a public housing development in Asheville, North Carolina, contacted police about a group of young men frequenting the parking lot. The manager suspected drug trafficking and reported that “people [were] walking around with guns.”
Asheville Police Detectives Brad Beddow and Steven Escobedo began surveillance.
During their investigation, they repeatedly saw Jermaine Derrick Carson, Jr. arrive as a backseat passenger in a Toyota Highlander driven by Calvin Washington. Although officers observed activity generally consistent with the property manager’s report, they did not see Carson personally engage in illegal activity. Officers also learned that Washington’s driver's license was suspended.
Several weeks later, officers participating in a joint operation encountered the Highlander again. Detective Beddow saw Washington driving and radioed other officers to stop the Highlander before it returned to Aston Park because he believed conducting the stop there would be more dangerous.
Another officer confirmed that Washington's license remained suspended. Agent Web Corthell located the Highlander, followed it, and initiated the traffic stop.
The Stop
Corthell approached Washington and asked for his driver's license. Washington admitted he did not have one and instead produced a North Carolina identification card.
At 11:25:22 p.m., Corthell began walking back toward his patrol vehicle to verify Washington's information. Officer Chase Hayes arrived approximately 30 seconds later.
At 11:25:52 p.m., Hayes walked past the Highlander's rear driver's-side window and testified that he smelled marijuana coming from inside the vehicle.
While talking with Washington, Hayes also noticed a knife between Washington's legs and a blue digital scale between the front seats.
Meanwhile, Corthell was working through the traffic investigation. He logged into a criminal-history database, checked Washington's identification, address, date of birth, license status, warrant status, and criminal history. He also checked the Highlander's registration and information concerning its registered owner.
At approximately 11:27 p.m., Corthell briefly spoke with another officer about whether they should bring a drug-detection dog to the scene. By then, Hayes had already smelled marijuana.
Hayes then informed the other officers that he believed they had probable cause to search the vehicle because he had smelled marijuana and observed a digital scale with white residue.
The Frisk
Detective Escobedo arrived and heard Hayes report the marijuana odor and digital scale.
Officers began removing the occupants from the Highlander. When Carson opened the rear door, Escobedo also smelled marijuana. Escobedo then frisked Carson.
Carson's pants were hanging near his knees, and Escobedo attempted to pull them up. He could
not fully do so because something appeared to be weighing them down.
Escobedo asked Carson to spread his feet. Carson said he could not. When Escobedo asked why, Carson responded that he had a gun.
Escobedo recovered a nine-millimeter Glock pistol from Carson's right pants leg. The gun was loaded with a round in the chamber. Carson, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawful possession of the firearm.
He moved to suppress.
Carson did not challenge the initial traffic stop. Instead, he argued that officers unlawfully prolonged the stop and that Escobedo lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him.
The district court denied the motion. Carson entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed.
Issue
The case presented two Fourth Amendment questions:
Did officers unlawfully prolong the traffic stop by conducting investigative activities unrelated to the driver's suspended license?
And:
Did officers have reasonable suspicion to frisk Carson, a passenger, for weapons after developing reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs were inside the vehicle?
Holding
No unlawful prolongation occurred, and the frisk was lawful.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Carson's motion to suppress.
The court held that an officer developed independent reasonable suspicion of drug activity when he smelled marijuana coming from the Highlander. Because that occurred while officers were still pursuing the original traffic mission, the subsequent drug investigation did not result in an unconstitutional extension of the stop.
The court also applied existing Fourth Circuit precedent holding that when officers reasonably suspect illegal drugs are inside a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop, they may, absent circumstances alleviating their safety concerns, order the occupants out and briefly frisk them for weapons.
Reasoning
A Traffic Stop Has a Mission
The Fourth Circuit began with Rodriguez v. United States.
A traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure, and its permissible duration is generally tied to its mission—addressing the traffic violation that justified the stop.
That mission ordinarily permits officers to perform tasks such as:
checking the driver's license;
checking for outstanding warrants;
examining registration and proof of insurance; and
taking reasonable measures related to officer safety.
Officers may also conduct unrelated investigation during the stop so long as it does not add time to the detention.
If officers develop independent reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, however, they may extend the stop to investigate that activity.
The Critical Question Was Timing
Carson argued that Corthell departed from the traffic mission by researching the Highlander and its owner and discussing whether officers should bring a drug-detection dog to the scene.
The Fourth Circuit focused heavily on the timeline.
The court used a three-part framework for determining whether an investigative detour during a traffic stop creates an unlawful seizure. The problem arises when an officer:
diverts from the traffic mission to investigate ordinary criminal activity;
does so in a way that adds time to the stop; and
lacks independent reasonable suspicion supporting the investigative detour.
Here, Hayes smelled marijuana at precisely 11:25:52 p.m.
Under then-binding Fourth Circuit precedent, the odor of marijuana provided reasonable suspicion and could provide probable cause to believe marijuana was present in the vehicle.
Even Carson conceded that if the district court credited Hayes's testimony about smelling marijuana at 11:25:52, probable cause to search the vehicle existed at that point.
That changed the constitutional analysis.
As the court explained:
“At that point, the reasonable duration and mission of the stop evolved.”
What Happened Before 11:25:52?
That became the key question.
Corthell began walking back toward his patrol vehicle at 11:25:22. Hayes smelled marijuana only 30 seconds later.
Corthell had to reach his patrol vehicle, access the CJLEADS database, complete two-factor authentication, enter Washington's information, and conduct legitimate license, warrant, and criminal-history checks before moving on to the inquiries Carson claimed were unrelated to the traffic mission.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that those sequential tasks made it essentially impossible for the challenged detours to have occurred during that 30-second window.
They therefore occurred either after or contemporaneously with Hayes detecting marijuana. By then, independent reasonable suspicion existed to expand the investigation.
The timeline saved the stop.
The Frisk Was a Separate Question
The court next addressed whether officers could frisk Carson. A lawful stop alone does not automatically authorize a frisk.
Under Terry, officers must have justification to believe the person is armed and dangerous. But Fourth Circuit precedent adds an important rule in vehicle stops involving illegal drugs.
In United States v. Sakyi, the Fourth Circuit held that when an officer conducting a lawful traffic stop reasonably suspects illegal drugs are inside the vehicle, the officer may, “in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns,” order the occupants out and briefly frisk them for weapons. The rule is based on the perceived connection between illegal drugs and firearms.
Here, officers lawfully stopped the Highlander. They then developed reasonable suspicion that marijuana was inside.
Under Sakyi, that was sufficient to permit Escobedo to briefly frisk Carson for weapons.
The Fourth Circuit therefore upheld the frisk and seizure of the Glock.
But One Judge Questioned Whether Sakyi Is Still Good Law
Judge Berner concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to challenge the continuing justification for Sakyi.
Importantly, she agreed that existing Fourth Circuit precedent required the court to uphold Carson's frisk. But she questioned the premise underlying that precedent.
Sakyi, decided in 1998, relied on the proposition that “where there are drugs, there are almost always guns.” Judge Berner argued that this assumption has become increasingly difficult to defend in the context of marijuana.
Marijuana laws and social attitudes have changed dramatically since Sakyi. Marijuana is now permitted for medical or recreational purposes in much of the country, even though federal law continues to regulate it.
In Judge Berner's view, proximity to marijuana no longer necessarily supports an automatic inference that a person is armed and dangerous.
She noted that the officers themselves repeatedly told the occupants that they were “not the weed police,” and the Asheville Police Department no longer charged individuals for possessing personal-use quantities of marijuana.
Yet, under existing Fourth Circuit precedent, the smell of marijuana still effectively supplied the basis for a weapons frisk. Judge Berner emphasized that other federal circuits take narrower approaches.
Some limit the drugs-and-guns inference to suspected drug trafficking, rather than mere personal use. Others treat suspected drug activity as only one factor within the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists to believe someone is armed and dangerous.
But a three-judge Fourth Circuit panel cannot overrule an earlier panel. So Sakyi controlled.
Judge Berner nevertheless warned that, as marijuana laws continue to evolve, the presumption “may no longer survive constitutional scrutiny.”
Street Takeaways
Traffic-stop cases often come down to seconds. Document the timeline. When the traffic mission began, what officers were doing, when new information developed, and when unrelated investigation began can determine whether a Rodriguez challenge succeeds.
The mission of a traffic stop can evolve. If officers develop independent reasonable suspicion of another crime while diligently handling the original traffic matter, they may extend the detention to investigate that new criminal activity.
Unrelated investigation is not automatically prohibited. Officers may investigate matters unrelated to the traffic violation during a stop so long as doing so does not add time—or independent reasonable suspicion supports the additional detention.
Do not assume a lawful stop automatically authorizes a frisk. A frisk requires a separate Fourth Amendment justification tied to officer safety.
In the Fourth Circuit, suspected illegal drugs inside a vehicle can currently justify frisks of the occupants. Under Sakyi, officers who reasonably suspect illegal drugs are in the vehicle may, absent factors alleviating safety concerns, remove the occupants and briefly frisk them for weapons.
But be careful applying the drugs-equal-guns rationale too broadly. Judge Berner's concurrence directly questioned whether marijuana possession should continue to support an automatic inference of dangerousness. Other circuits already take narrower approaches.
Marijuana law is changing Fourth Amendment analysis. Officers should not assume that older cases involving marijuana will necessarily retain the same force as legalization and changes in marijuana enforcement continue.
Disclaimer
This article is provided for educational and training purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Court decisions are fact-specific, and legal standards may vary by jurisdiction. Officers should consult current controlling authority, agency policy, and legal counsel when appropriate.
