Your Phone at the Border: Fourth Circuit Says Manual Searches Require No Suspicion

United States v. Belmonte Cardozo, No. 25-4239 (4th Cir. July 13, 2026)

TL;DR

A traveler arriving at Washington Dulles International Airport from Bolivia was stopped for a customs inspection. A CBP officer asked him to unlock two iPhones. He complied. The officer manually opened the photo galleries, navigated to the phones’ hidden-photo folders, and discovered illegal images within approximately two minutes.

The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the significant privacy interests recognized by the Supreme Court in Riley v. California meant that searching the digital contents of his phones required individualized suspicion.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed.

A manual search of a cellphone at the international border is a routine border search and requires no warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.

But the distinction between a manual search and a forensic search matters. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, a forensic cellphone search is nonroutine and requires some measure of individualized suspicion.

Facts

On May 8, 2024, Jose Belmonte Cardozo traveled from Bolivia to the United States and landed at Washington Dulles International Airport. CBP Port Intelligence Officer Sara Oliphant was waiting for him.

When Belmonte Cardozo presented himself for customs inspection, he produced two iPhones. Oliphant asked him to unlock the phones, and he complied. She opened the phones’ photo galleries and navigated to their hidden galleries. There, she discovered sexually explicit photographs and videos involving prepubescent girls.

The search was brief. Only about two minutes passed between Oliphant taking possession of the phones and discovering the illegal material. CBP officers contacted Homeland Security agents, who responded and arrested Belmonte Cardozo.

A federal grand jury subsequently indicted him on multiple child-exploitation and child-pornography offenses. Belmonte Cardozo moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his phones.

The district court recognized that there was an unresolved question concerning whether some level of individualized suspicion was required to search digital information on a cellphone at the border. But it concluded that, even if individualized suspicion were required, Oliphant had sufficient suspicion to conduct the search. The court alternatively found that she acted in good faith.

Belmonte Cardozo entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to challenge the suppression ruling.

He appealed.

Issue

Is a manual search of the digital contents of a cellphone at the international border a routine border search that may be conducted without individualized suspicion?

Holding

Yes.

The Fourth Circuit held that manual cellphone searches at the border are routine border searches and therefore do not require individualized suspicion.

The court joined every other federal circuit that had addressed the issue.

The court distinguished a manual search—where an officer physically navigates through information accessible to an ordinary user—from a forensic search using external hardware or software to copy, extract, recover, and analyze information from the device.

Because Oliphant conducted only a brief manual search, the Fourth Amendment did not require reasonable suspicion.

Reasoning

The Border Search Exception Is Different

Ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before conducting a search.

The international border is different.

The border-search exception rests upon the sovereign’s longstanding authority to control who and what enters the country. The Supreme Court has recognized that the government’s interest in preventing unwanted persons and contraband from entering the United States is at its “zenith at the international border.”

Travelers also have diminished expectations of privacy when crossing the border.

That balance permits routine border searches without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion. 

The rule also extends beyond a physical land border. The border-search exception applies at the border’s functional equivalent, including an international airport such as Dulles.

Not Every Border Search Is Routine

The government’s authority at the border is broad, but it is not unlimited.

The Fourth Circuit distinguished between routine and nonroutine border searches. Routine searches require no individualized suspicion.

Nonroutine searches require some level of individualized suspicion. The court explained that highly intrusive searches implicating significant dignity and privacy interests, destructive property searches, and searches conducted in particularly offensive ways may qualify as nonroutine.

The question in this case was whether manually navigating through a cellphone crosses that line.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that it does not.

Riley Did Not Control the Result

Belmonte Cardozo relied heavily upon Riley v. California.

In Riley, the Supreme Court recognized that modern cellphones are fundamentally different from

most physical objects officers encounter during an arrest. They can store enormous amounts of intensely personal information and contain, in the Supreme Court’s words, the “privacies of life.”

Because of those privacy interests, the Supreme Court held that officers generally cannot search the digital contents of a cellphone under the search-incident-to-arrest exception simply because they lawfully arrested the phone’s owner.

But Riley did not create a categorical rule requiring a warrant for every cellphone search.

In fact, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that other exceptions to the warrant requirement could justify warrantless searches of particular phones.

This case involved a different exception: the border-search exception.

Manual and Forensic Searches Are Different

The heart of the Fourth Circuit’s analysis was the distinction between a manual cellphone search and a forensic cellphone search.

The court had previously considered forensic cellphone searches in United States v. Kolsuz.

There, officers initially manually examined a phone but later transported it to another facility and connected it to forensic equipment.

The forensic examination lasted an entire month and generated an 896-page report containing contacts, emails, messages, photographs, videos, calendar information, browsing history, call logs, and precise GPS-location information.

The Fourth Circuit held that such a forensic examination was a nonroutine border search requiring some measure of individualized suspicion. But Kolsuz left unanswered whether the same rule applied to a basic manual search.

Belmonte Cardozo answers that question.

The court identified several important differences.

First, a person does the searching during a manual search. The officer opens the phone and views information an ordinary user could access. During a forensic search, the device is connected to external hardware or software that copies and analyzes its contents.

Second, the breadth of the searches is dramatically different.

A manual search has natural human limitations. As the court explained, it ends when the officer’s “time, patience and attention give out.”

Oliphant found the illegal images after approximately two minutes. By contrast, the forensic examination in Kolsuz lasted a month and generated nearly 900 pages of information.

Third, forensic technology can uncover information beyond what an ordinary user can see.

Forensic tools may recover deleted files, cached fragments, location histories, system logs, and metadata the phone’s owner may not even know exists. A manual search generally exposes only information accessible through ordinary use of the device.

Finally, a forensic search can create a permanent copy of the phone’s contents.

A manual search is limited by an officer’s memory and notes. A forensic examination can create a portable and searchable duplicate that investigators can retain and examine later.

The Fourth Circuit summarized the distinction with an important line:

“A forensic search does not end at the border crossing; it begins there.” 

No Individualized Suspicion Was Required

Balancing the government’s substantial interests at the border against the traveler’s privacy interests, the Fourth Circuit held that manual cellphone searches are routine border searches that do not require individualized suspicion. 

The Fourth Circuit also noted that it was joining every other federal circuit to address the question. But the court did not give border officers unlimited authority merely by labeling an examination “manual.”

The court specifically recognized that a manual search could potentially become constitutionally problematic because of its duration or scope.

If the government devoted substantial time and manpower to manually searching a phone or deprived a traveler of the device for an extended period, other Fourth Amendment principles could come into play.

Quoting Terry v. Ohio, the court noted that even a search that is reasonable when it begins can become unreasonable because of its “intolerable intensity and scope.” 

The court did not determine exactly where that line lies. This two-minute search came nowhere close to testing it.

Street Takeaways

The border is constitutionally different. Do not automatically apply ordinary interior-search rules to a border search. The government possesses substantially greater search authority at the international border and its functional equivalent.

Manual cellphone searches at the border require no individualized suspicion in the Fourth Circuit. Under Belmonte Cardozo, officers conducting a routine manual examination of user-accessible information do not need a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.

Manual and forensic searches are constitutionally different. Scrolling through information accessible to an ordinary user is different from connecting the device to forensic technology capable of copying, extracting, recovering, and analyzing its contents.

Know when the search changes character. Moving from manual examination to forensic extraction can trigger a different Fourth Amendment standard.

Scope and duration still matter. “Manual” does not necessarily mean unlimited. The Fourth Circuit expressly left open the possibility that an exceptionally prolonged or intensive manual search could become unreasonable.

Do not overread Riley. Riley generally requires a warrant to search a cellphone incident to arrest. It did not eliminate other recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Know the jurisdiction and the search method. Courts have treated basic manual border searches differently from more intrusive forensic examinations. Officers should be able to clearly articulate exactly how the phone was searched.

Disclaimer

This article is provided for educational and training purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Court decisions are fact-specific, and legal standards may vary by jurisdiction. Officers should consult current controlling authority, agency policy, and legal counsel when appropriate.