When a “Voluntary Encounter” Becomes a Seizure: 4th Cir. Suppresses Gun After Officers Blocked Parked Car

United States v. Williams, No. 24-4512 (4th Cir. July 7, 2026)

TL;DR

Police received an anonymous 911 report that a light-skinned male with braids was sitting in a white Mercedes near an apartment-complex pool and “appears to be making drug transactions.” Two officers responded in separate marked police vehicles.

The officers intended to make a voluntary encounter. But instead of parking in available spaces, they simultaneously stopped their patrol vehicles in the roadway, with one positioned approximately 15 feet away and partially in front of the Mercedes.

The officers exited their vehicles and immediately smelled marijuana. That odor ultimately led to a search of the Mercedes and discovery of a handgun.

The problem was what happened before the officers smelled the marijuana.

The Fourth Circuit held that the positioning of the patrol vehicles constituted a show of authority that effectively blocked the Mercedes and communicated to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave.

That meant Williams was seized the moment the officers stopped their patrol vehicles—not when they later approached the Mercedes or smelled marijuana.

And at that precise moment, officers did not have reasonable suspicion.

The anonymous tip provided identifying information but contained no predictive information, meaningful basis of knowledge, or details allowing officers to corroborate the alleged criminal activity. Williams's presence in a high-crime area did not cure the problem.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the suppression ruling and vacated Williams's conviction.

The lesson is simple: Officers may intend to conduct a consensual encounter, but their intent does not control. If the manner of approach objectively communicates that the person is not free to leave, the encounter is a seizure—and reasonable suspicion must already exist.

Facts

Kevin Williams and two friends were sitting in a white Mercedes E-Class sedan parked near the pool area of an apartment complex.

The Mercedes was backed into a parking space between two other vehicles.

A 911 caller reported a white Mercedes parked near the pool with several people inside, including a light-brown-skinned male with either dreads or twists, who was possibly selling or possessing narcotics.

The caller said he lived in the neighborhood but wanted to remain anonymous.

The information sent to officers through their computer-aided dispatch system instructed them to check for a:

“BRO SKINNED, LT SKINNED, MALE WITH BRAIDS”

sitting in a:

“WHI MERZ SEDAN”

who:

“APPEARS TO BE MAKING DRUG TRANSACTIONS.”

Importantly, the call was classified “Priority Normal,” and the CAD report specifically noted “NO WPNS SEEN.” 

Officers Pistone and Wilson responded in separate marked police vehicles. They did not activate their emergency lights or sirens and drove through the apartment complex at normal speeds.

When they reached the pool area and saw Williams's Mercedes, both officers suddenly stopped.

Pistone stopped his patrol vehicle in the middle of the roadway, perpendicular to and partially in front of the Mercedes, approximately 15 feet away. Wilson stopped his patrol vehicle a few yards behind Pistone.

The photographs reproduced in the opinion show the Mercedes backed between two vehicles with the two marked patrol vehicles positioned in the roadway directly in front of the parking area.

After stopping, the officers exited their vehicles. They immediately smelled marijuana. The officers approached the Mercedes, and Williams admitted that he and the other occupants had smoked marijuana.

Based on the odor and Williams's admission, officers ordered everyone out and searched the Mercedes. They discovered a handgun between the driver's seat and center console.

Williams admitted the gun belonged to him.  Because Williams had a prior felony conviction, he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

He moved to suppress.

Williams argued that officers seized him when they positioned their patrol vehicles in front of his Mercedes and that, at that moment, they lacked reasonable suspicion.

The district court disagreed.

It found that Williams was not initially seized because there was enough room for him to drive away. According to the district court, the encounter changed only after officers smelled marijuana.

Williams was convicted after a bench trial and appealed.

Issue

Did officers seize Williams when they positioned two marked police vehicles in the roadway in front of his parked Mercedes?

And, if so:

Did the anonymous 911 report and Williams's presence in a high-crime area provide reasonable suspicion to justify that seizure?

Holding

Yes, a seizure occurred. No, reasonable suspicion did not exist.

The Fourth Circuit held that a reasonable person in Williams's position would not have felt free to leave when the officers positioned their patrol vehicles in the roadway.

Although Williams may have been physically capable of maneuvering his Mercedes around the police vehicles, the Fourth Amendment does not ask merely whether escape was physically possible.

The question is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to do it.

The court concluded that Williams was effectively blocked in and that the officers' positioning constituted a show of authority.

Because the seizure occurred before officers exited their vehicles and smelled marijuana, the marijuana odor could not retroactively justify it.

At the moment of seizure, officers possessed only an insufficiently reliable anonymous tip and Williams's presence in an area associated with crime.

That was not enough.

Reasoning

A Consensual Encounter Does Not Require Reasonable Suspicion

Police officers do not need reasonable suspicion merely to approach someone and ask questions.

As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the officers and go about his business, the encounter remains consensual.

But an encounter becomes a Fourth Amendment seizure when officers use physical force or a show of authority that would communicate to a reasonable person that he is not free to terminate the encounter. The inquiry is objective and considers the totality of the circumstances. 

That distinction became especially important here because Officer Pistone testified that he actually intended to make “voluntary contact” with the occupants. He also testified that, before smelling marijuana, he would have allowed Williams to drive away.

But an officer's subjective intention does not determine whether a seizure occurred. The question is what the officer's conduct objectively communicated to the person being approached.

Blocking a Vehicle Can Be a Show of Authority

The Fourth Circuit emphasized the positioning of the patrol vehicles.

Whether officers block a person's vehicle is an important consideration when determining whether an encounter is consensual. And a vehicle does not have to be completely physically trapped before a seizure occurs.

The court relied heavily on United States v. Jones, where a defendant technically could have maneuvered his vehicle away from police but would have been required to take evasive action that a reasonable law-abiding person would not attempt in the presence of officers.

The Fourth Amendment asks whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave—not whether a sufficiently determined driver could physically find a way out.

Williams Was Effectively Blocked In

The majority concluded that it was not “readily apparent” that Williams had enough room to simply drive away without special maneuvering.

Pistone's vehicle was approximately 15 feet away and partially in front of the Mercedes. The Mercedes itself was approximately 16 feet long and was parked between two other vehicles.

To leave in either direction, Williams would have needed to drive toward Pistone's marked patrol vehicle while maneuvering close to one of the vehicles parked beside him. The court believed he might even have needed a multipoint turn.

If Williams attempted to leave to the right, he also would have needed to drive past Wilson's police vehicle, which was parked in the roadway.

Under those circumstances, the court held that a reasonable person would not have felt free to attempt the maneuver.

The Entire Police Approach Mattered

The court did not rely solely on whether the Mercedes could physically escape.

Two officers arrived simultaneously in separate marked police vehicles.

They suddenly stopped.

Both patrol vehicles remained in the roadway instead of pulling into available parking spaces.

One was positioned partially in front of Williams.

The majority concluded that parking perpendicular to Williams's vehicle in the roadway—despite nearby available parking spaces—communicated that Williams was the subject of police attention.

The court explained:

“Parking perpendicular to Williams’ car in the middle roadway inherently sent a message of seizure to Williams.” 

Considering everything together, the Fourth Circuit held that Williams was seized when the officers stopped their vehicles in the roadway. 

The Marijuana Odor Came Too Late

This timing was critical.

Once the officers opened their doors, they smelled marijuana.

That fact ultimately provided a basis for further investigation and the vehicle search.

But the majority concluded that the seizure had already occurred.

The government therefore needed to establish reasonable suspicion based upon what officers knew before they smelled marijuana.

The Fourth Amendment does not allow subsequently discovered evidence to retroactively justify an earlier seizure.

So the court turned to what the officers knew when they parked their patrol vehicles.

The Anonymous Tip Was Not Enough

Anonymous tips can support reasonable suspicion, but their reliability matters.

The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Florida v. J.L.

An anonymous caller's ability to accurately describe a person's appearance and location does not necessarily establish reliability regarding the allegation of criminal conduct.

As the Supreme Court explained in J.L., reasonable suspicion requires reliability in the tipster's assertion of illegality, not merely an ability to identify a particular person.

Here, police corroborated that:

• a white Mercedes existed;

• it was near the pool;

• several people were inside; and

• an occupant generally matched the description.

But those were readily observable facts.

They did not corroborate drug dealing.

The caller provided no predictive information.

The caller did not say when a transaction would occur, who would participate, where the occupants would travel, or describe any specific hand-to-hand exchange.

The officers therefore had no meaningful way to test whether the caller actually possessed reliable knowledge of concealed criminal activity.

Calling 911 Did Not Automatically Make the Tip Reliable

The government relied on Navarette v. California, arguing that the caller's use of the 911 system strengthened the tip's reliability.

The Fourth Circuit distinguished Navarette.

There, a caller contemporaneously reported that a particular truck had just run her vehicle off the road. The report suggested firsthand knowledge of a specific, dangerous event requiring immediate intervention.

This case was different.

The report merely said that the occupants “appeared” to be making drug transactions.

No weapons were reported.

The call was designated “Priority Normal.”

The officers responded without lights or sirens.

And the officers had the ability to conduct surveillance or attempt a consensual encounter to corroborate the allegation before making a seizure.

There was no comparable emergency requiring immediate action.

The Fourth Circuit therefore rejected the idea that merely using the 911 system automatically transforms an otherwise unreliable anonymous accusation into reasonable suspicion.

The court summarized its rule:

“The use of the 911 system, standing alone, does not establish reliability.” 

High-Crime Area Added Little

The government also relied on the officers' testimony that the apartment complex was associated with violent crime and drug activity.

That fact was relevant—but weak.

Presence in a high-crime area can be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances, but it cannot independently establish reasonable suspicion.

The Fourth Circuit characterized presence in a high-crime area as a “weak and generic factor” and gave it little weight here.

The Totality Still Did Not Add Up

The court did not simply analyze each fact in isolation.

It considered everything together. But the totality of weak factors still failed to create reasonable suspicion.

The officers had an unreliable anonymous accusation, confirmation of innocent identifying

information, and Williams's presence in an area associated with crime.

They had not personally observed a hand-to-hand transaction or any other specific behavior suggesting drug activity.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the facts did not provide a particularized and objective basis to believe Williams was engaged in criminal activity.

The seizure was therefore unlawful.

Street Takeaways

Your intention to conduct a consensual encounter does not make it consensual. Courts apply an objective test. Ask what your actions would communicate to a reasonable person—not what you intended them to communicate.

Think about where you park. Positioning a marked police vehicle so that leaving would require a person to maneuver toward or around the patrol vehicle can convert an intended voluntary encounter into a seizure.

“Technically able to leave” is not necessarily “free to leave.” The question is not simply whether the vehicle can physically squeeze through an opening. The question is whether a reasonable person would believe he was free to attempt it.

Reasonable suspicion must exist when the seizure begins. Evidence discovered seconds later cannot retroactively justify an earlier detention.

Corroborate criminal activity—not merely identity. Confirming a vehicle's color, location, or a person's appearance may establish that officers found the person described by an anonymous caller. It does not necessarily establish that the caller was reliable about the alleged crime.

A 911 call is not automatically reliable. Use of the 911 system is relevant, but Williams makes clear that it does not, standing alone, establish the reliability necessary for reasonable suspicion.

High-crime area remains a factor, not a substitute for individualized suspicion. The Fourth Circuit treated it as a weak contextual consideration here.

When reasonable suspicion is questionable, preserve the consensual nature of the encounter. If circumstances permit, park normally, avoid unnecessarily restricting movement, approach without a show of authority, and develop additional facts before escalating the encounter into a detention.

Disclaimer

This article is provided for educational and training purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Court decisions are fact-specific, and legal standards may vary by jurisdiction. Officers should consult current controlling authority, agency policy, and legal counsel when appropriate.