53 Taser Cycles, Neck Restraint, & Death: 10th Cir. Rejects Monell Claim Despite Criminal Conviction of Officers

Lakey v. Bryant, No. 25-7068 (10th Cir. July 7, 2026) 

TL;DR

The Tenth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of an Oklahoma sheriff following the death of Jared Lakey, who died after being tased 53 times over approximately nine minutes by municipal officers before an assisting sheriff's deputy applied a lateral vascular neck restraint (LVNR).

Although the individual municipal officers were ultimately found civilly liable for excessive force and guilty in the criminal proceeding, the court held that the evidence did not support supervisory or municipal liability against the sheriff under § 1983.

The opinion serves as an excellent primer on several recurring § 1983 issues: supervisory liability, qualified immunity for policymakers, Monell claims based on informal custom, and ratification. For agencies, the decision underscores an important reality: a constitutional violation by an individual officer does not automatically create liability for the sheriff or municipality.

The Facts

On the evening of July 4, 2019, Jared Lakey was observed running naked through a residential neighborhood in Wilson, Oklahoma while screaming incoherently. Wilson police officers Joshua Taylor and Brandon Dingman responded to reports of a possibly intoxicated or drug-impaired individual.

When Officer Dingman attempted to secure Lakey after he had gone to the ground, Lakey began to rise. Rather than immediately attempting to handcuff him, Officers Taylor and Dingman repeatedly deployed their conducted energy weapons.

Over the course of approximately nine minutes, the officers activated their Tasers 53 separate times while waiting for backup to arrive.

The request for assistance triggered Carter County's Mutual Aid Policy, which required sheriff's deputies to respond to requests from smaller agencies. Deputy David Duggan arrived several minutes later.

By the time Duggan arrived:

• Lakey was seated on the ground;

• he was not fighting;

• he was not actively resisting;

• he was making no threatening gestures.

Without issuing commands, Duggan approached from behind and applied a Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint (LVNR) until Lakey lost consciousness. Officers then handcuffed him.

Duggan later testified that he used the neck restraint not because Lakey's conduct required it, but because he feared the Wilson officers would not assist him if he attempted a hands-on arrest. He had learned the technique while previously serving as an Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper. The Carter County Sheriff's Office neither trained deputies to use neck restraints nor had any deputy previously used one during Sheriff Bryant's administration.

Lakey died two days later. The medical examiner concluded his death resulted from cardiac arrest caused in part by the repeated Taser deployments and the neck restraint.

The Litigation

The Estate filed suit under § 1983 asserting multiple theories against Sheriff Chris Bryant, including:

• supervisory liability for maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy;

• failure to train deputies responding under that policy;

• Monell liability based upon an alleged custom of permitting excessive force;

• spoliation of evidence after the sheriff discarded a damaged cell phone containing text messages from the night of the incident.

The Wilson officers ultimately went to trial and were found civilly liable for excessive force. And later both were found guilty in criminal court. Each was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

The jury, however, rejected the claims against Sheriff Bryant in his official capacity, and the district court granted qualified immunity on the individual-capacity supervisory claims.

The Legal Issues

The Tenth Circuit addressed four principal issues:

1. Whether Sheriff Bryant was entitled to qualified immunity for maintaining the Mutual Aid Policy.

2. Whether sufficient evidence existed to establish an unofficial custom of excessive force under Monell.

3. Whether excluding evidence that Deputy Duggan was never criminally charged required reversal.

4. Whether sanctions should have been imposed after the sheriff discarded his damaged cell phone.

   
   

The Court's Holding

The Tenth Circuit affirmed across the board.

Although the underlying force used against Lakey was unquestionably serious—and the Wilson officers were found liable—the Estate failed to establish supervisory liability, municipal liability, reversible evidentiary error, or entitlement to Rule 37 sanctions.

The Court's Reasoning

1) Supervisory Liability Requires Clearly Established Law Directed at the Supervisor

The court began by emphasizing an often-overlooked principle in § 1983 litigation.

When suing a supervisor individually, plaintiffs cannot simply show that the subordinate officer violated clearly established law.

Instead, plaintiffs must identify precedent showing the supervisor's own conduct violated clearly established law. Supervisory liability requires proof of:

• personal involvement,

• a causal connection,

• deliberate indifference,

• and clearly established law applicable to the supervisory conduct itself.

Here, the Estate argued that Sheriff Bryant's Mutual Aid Policy created an obvious risk of constitutional injury because he knew Wilson officers often failed to provide adequate backup.

The court disagreed.

Although Bryant acknowledged that inadequate backup increased risks to deputies and citizens, no precedent established that maintaining such a mutual-aid policy itself violated the Constitution. Nor was this one of those "obvious" constitutional violations requiring no case directly on point.

Accordingly, qualified immunity applied.

2) Monell Requires More Than One Bad Incident

Perhaps the most useful section for police litigation concerns municipal liability.

The Estate argued Sheriff Bryant effectively ratified Deputy Duggan's conduct because:

• Duggan was never disciplined;

• policies remained unchanged;

• no additional training occurred;

• Bryant allegedly supported Duggan after the incident.

The court explained that plaintiffs were improperly mixing two separate Monell theories:

• ratification, and

• informal custom. 

Even assuming post-incident conduct could support an inference of approval, an informal custom still requires evidence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of similar constitutional violations. One incident—even a tragic one—is generally insufficient.

Here, plaintiffs produced evidence only concerning Lakey's death.

There was no evidence that:

• Duggan had previously used excessive force;

• other deputies routinely used excessive force;

• excessive force represented an accepted practice within the sheriff's office.

Without evidence of repeated similar misconduct, Monell liability failed as a matter of law.

3) Ratification Theory Was Waived

Another important procedural lesson appears in the court's waiver discussion.

Although the Estate attempted to argue ratification on appeal, it had expressly informed the district court that it was not pursuing a ratification theory.

The Tenth Circuit treated that decision as an intentional waiver.

Once waived, the appellate court declined to resurrect the theory.

For litigators, this portion serves as an important reminder that litigation theories abandoned in district court generally cannot be revived later.

4) Excluding Criminal Charging Decisions Was Harmless

The Estate also challenged exclusion of evidence showing Deputy Duggan was never criminally charged while the Wilson officers were prosecuted.

The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court provided very little explanation for excluding the evidence under Rule 403.

Ordinarily, courts should articulate why probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Nevertheless, any error was harmless because the excluded evidence related primarily to the waived ratification theory rather than issues actually before the jury.

5) Spoliation Requires More Than Lost Evidence

Finally, the Estate argued Sheriff Bryant intentionally destroyed evidence by discarding a damaged cell phone after receiving notice to preserve evidence.

The district court found:

• Bryant had a duty to preserve the phone;

• the phone was destroyed after being run over;

• Bryant acted negligently rather than intentionally;

• plaintiffs failed to demonstrate prejudice.

The Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court incorrectly assumed plaintiffs always bear the burden of proving prejudice under Rule 37(e). The Rule actually leaves that determination to the district judge depending on the circumstances.

Even so, the error proved harmless.

The allegedly missing text messages would have supported only the waived ratification theory or, at most, additional evidence of approval following the incident. They would not establish the required widespread pattern necessary for Monell liability.

Likewise, the record supported the district court's finding that Bryant acted negligently—not intentionally—thereby foreclosing severe sanctions such as default judgment.

Street Takeaways

• One unconstitutional incident usually does not establish Monell liability. Plaintiffs generally must prove a continuing pattern of similar constitutional violations.

• Supervisory liability is its own constitutional claim. Clearly established law governing the subordinate officer is not enough; plaintiffs must identify precedent showing the supervisor's own conduct violated clearly established law.

• Mutual-aid policies are not inherently unconstitutional. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that maintaining the policy itself created an obvious or clearly established constitutional violation.

• Failure to discipline after an incident does not automatically establish an unconstitutional custom. It may be relevant evidence, but standing alone it does not satisfy Monell's pattern requirement.

• Agencies should preserve electronic evidence immediately after critical incidents. Although the sheriff prevailed, this litigation illustrates how discarded electronic evidence can generate years of collateral litigation.

• Be cautious with neck restraints. While the court did not decide the constitutionality of Deputy Duggan's LVNR, the opinion repeatedly notes that the sheriff's office did not train deputies to use neck restraints and that none had previously employed one.

Bottom Line

Lakey v. Bryant illustrates that tragic facts and even proven excessive force do not automatically create supervisory or municipal liability. The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that § 1983 imposes demanding requirements for holding supervisors and governmental entities responsible. Without clearly established law governing the supervisor's conduct or evidence of a widespread pattern supporting Monell liability, claims against the sheriff could not survive—even where the underlying use of force resulted in a death and individual officers were found liable.

Disclaimer

This case summary is provided for educational and training purposes only and is not intended as legal advice. Court decisions are highly fact-specific, and the outcome of any particular case may differ based on jurisdiction, applicable law, or unique factual circumstances. Officers should always follow their agency's policies, training, and the advice of their legal counsel or prosecutor. Readers are encouraged to review the complete opinion before relying on any summarized legal principle. This summary reflects the court's decision as of the date issued and should not be interpreted as creating new legal standards beyond those recognized by the court.