Can the Government Take Your Guns Because You Smoke Marijuana? The Supreme Court Says No.

United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. ___ (2026)

TL;DR

The Supreme Court held that the federal government's prosecution of Ali Hemani under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)—the statute prohibiting firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances—violated the Second Amendment as applied to him.

The government attempted to disarm Hemani solely because he admitted using marijuana several times per week, despite no evidence that he was intoxicated while possessing a firearm, dangerous to himself or others, or incapable of managing his affairs.

Applying the historical-tradition test established in Bruen and refined in Rahimi, the Court concluded that the government failed to identify a historical analogue supporting such a broad firearm prohibition. The decision is narrow and does not address firearm restrictions on addicts, intoxicated persons, felons, or cases involving individualized proof of dangerousness.

Why it matters: This is one of the most significant post-Bruen Second Amendment decisions to date. The Court substantially limits the government's ability to rely on §922(g)(3) to prosecute otherwise law-abiding gun owners based solely on marijuana use.

What it does not do: The Court expressly left open the possibility that Congress could enact more targeted firearm restrictions tied to dangerousness, intoxication, addiction, or specific drugs shown to create a heightened risk of violence.

Facts

Ali Danial Hemani was born in Texas, is a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan, and had spent most of his life living in the Dallas area while maintaining stable employment. Federal authorities suspected members of the Hemani family of terrorism-related activities and obtained authority to search the family home in 2022.

During the search, Hemani cooperated extensively with investigators. He voluntarily surrendered a firearm located in the home, directed agents to marijuana on the property, and agreed to an interview. During that interview, Hemani admitted using marijuana "about every other day." Agents also discovered cocaine in a closet belonging to his parents. Hemani claimed ownership of the cocaine but stated that his mother had hidden it from him and that he had not recently used it.

Notably, the government never charged Hemani with any terrorism-related offense. Nor was he charged with drug trafficking, cocaine possession, violent conduct, misuse of a firearm, or any offense involving actual intoxication while armed. Instead, more than six months after the search, prosecutors filed a single-count indictment under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3), alleging that Hemani illegally possessed a firearm because he was an unlawful user of marijuana.

The government's theory was straightforward and sweeping. Because Hemani admitted using marijuana regularly, federal law automatically prohibited him from possessing any firearm. According to the government, no showing of dangerousness, impairment, addiction, or misuse of a weapon was required.

Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that applying §922(g)(3) to him violated the Second Amendment. The district court agreed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the prosecution was constitutional.

Issues

1. Does the Second Amendment permit the federal government to prohibit firearm possession by a person solely because he regularly uses marijuana?

2. Can the government justify §922(g)(3)'s firearm prohibition by analogizing it to historical laws regulating habitual drunkards?

3. Has the government demonstrated a historical tradition of firearm regulation supporting the categorical disarmament of all unlawful users of controlled substances?

Court's Decision (Holding)

No.

The Supreme Court held that the government's prosecution of Ali Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful-user provision violated the Second Amendment because the government failed to identify a relevant historical tradition supporting the categorical disarmament of individuals based solely on regular marijuana use. The Fifth Circuit's judgment dismissing the indictment was affirmed.

Reasoning

1. The government conceded that the Second Amendment covers Hemani's conduct.

The Court began with the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen. Under that test, courts first ask whether the Second Amendment's text covers the conduct at issue. If it does, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the challenged regulation is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Importantly, the government conceded that §922(g)(3) burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment because it completely bars a class of people from possessing firearms for any purpose.

Thus, the government's entire case depended on finding historical analogues sufficient to justify the restriction.

2. Historical "habitual drunkard" laws did not target the same people.

The government argued that historical laws regulating habitual drunkards were analogous to modern restrictions on unlawful drug users. The Court rejected that comparison.

According to the historical record, a "habitual drunkard" was not simply someone who drank regularly. Rather, the term generally referred to individuals whose alcohol consumption rendered them incapable of managing their affairs, mentally incompetent, or unable to exercise self-control.

The Court emphasized that early America had a culture of widespread alcohol consumption. Many prominent founders drank regularly. Historical laws therefore targeted people whose intoxication produced persistent incapacitation—not ordinary users of intoxicants.

By contrast, the government's interpretation of §922(g)(3) automatically disarmed anyone who regularly used any amount of any controlled substance for a non-prescribed purpose, regardless of impairment or dangerousness.

The Court found that distinction fatal.

3. The historical laws served different purposes.

The government also argued that both historical drunkard laws and §922(g)(3) sought to protect society from unusually dangerous people.

Again, the Court disagreed.

Historical vagrancy laws were largely designed to encourage productive labor and suppress perceived social vices rather than prevent firearm violence.

Similarly, civil commitment laws often sought to protect habitual drunkards from self-destruction and shield their families from financial ruin.

The surety laws cited by the government generally targeted misconduct, scandals against public morals, and threats to community order—not categories of persons deemed inherently violent.

Because these historical laws pursued substantially different objectives, they could not support the government's modern firearm prohibition.

4. Historical laws operated differently than §922(g)(3).

The Court next focused on the "how" of the historical regulations.

Historically, individuals typically received some form of judicial process before losing liberty. Vagrants generally had to be convicted. Habitual drunkards usually underwent proceedings before probate courts. Surety statutes required hearings before a magistrate.

Section 922(g)(3), however, works automatically. According to the government's interpretation, a person loses the right to possess firearms immediately upon becoming an unlawful user of a controlled substance. No hearing, adjudication, or individualized finding is required.

That procedural difference further undermined the government's historical analogy.

5. The government's own treatment of marijuana undercut its argument.

The Court identified a final problem.

The government insisted that §922(g)(3) targets categorically dangerous individuals. Yet the statute's reach is defined by the Controlled Substances Act, which classifies drugs for many reasons unrelated to violence.

Moreover, the Court noted several developments that weakened the government's dangerousness argument:

• The Department of Justice previously directed federal prosecutors to limit marijuana prosecutions.

• Most states have legalized marijuana to some degree.

• The federal government recently moved certain marijuana products from Schedule I to Schedule III.

• Marijuana use has become widespread throughout the country.

Given those realities, the Court found it difficult for the government to maintain that all regular marijuana users are categorically violent or unusually dangerous.

6. The ruling is intentionally narrow.

Justice Gorsuch repeatedly emphasized that the Court was deciding only the specific theory advanced by the government.

The Court expressly declined to address:

• Firearm bans on addicts;

• Restrictions on persons who are currently intoxicated;

• Future legislation targeting specific dangerous drugs;

• The constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute;

• Cases involving individualized proof of dangerousness.

The Court held only that the government could not automatically strip Hemani of his Second Amendment rights solely because he used marijuana a few times per week.

Street Takeaways

• Mere marijuana use is not enough, standing alone, to justify disarmament under the Second Amendment according to the Supreme Court's decision in Hemani.

• Prosecutors cannot rely solely on a person's admission of regular marijuana use and assume constitutional authority to prohibit firearm possession.

• Courts applying Bruen will continue demanding historically grounded analogues for firearm restrictions.

• Evidence of actual dangerousness, impairment, intoxication, or addiction may become increasingly important in future firearms prosecutions involving drug users.

• The decision does not invalidate all firearm restrictions on drug users.

• The ruling leaves §922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession), restrictions on addicts, and restrictions tied to individualized dangerousness largely untouched.

• Law enforcement officers should recognize that the mere presence of marijuana use and firearm possession may no longer automatically support federal prosecution under §922(g)(3) in circumstances similar to Hemani's.

Disclaimer

This article is provided for educational and training purposes only. It is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as a substitute for consulting qualified legal counsel. Laws, court decisions, and agency policies change over time. Officers, investigators, attorneys, and agencies should consult current statutes, case law, and local legal advisors before making operational or legal decisions.